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ABSTRACT
We study the problem of selecting the top-k candidates from a pool
of applicants, where each candidate is associated with a score indi-
cating his/her aptitude. Depending on the specific scenario, such
as job search or college admissions, these scores may be the results
of standardized tests or other predictors of future performance and
utility. We consider a situation in which some groups of candidates
experience historical and present disadvantage that makes their
chances of being accepted much lower than other groups. In these
circumstances, we wish to apply an affirmative action policy to
reduce acceptance rate disparities, while avoiding any large de-
crease in the aptitude of the candidates that are eventually selected.
Our algorithmic design is motivated by the frequently observed
phenomenon that discrimination disproportionately affects individ-
uals who simultaneously belong to multiple disadvantaged groups,
defined along intersecting dimensions such as gender, race, sexual
orientation, socio-economic status, and disability. In short, our al-
gorithm’s objective is to simultaneously (i) select candidates with
high utility, and (ii) level up the representation of disadvantaged
intersectional classes. This naturally involves trade-offs and is com-
putationally challenging due to the the combinatorial explosion of
potential subgroups as more attributes are considered. We propose
two algorithms to solve this problem, analyze them, and evalu-
ate them experimentally using a dataset of university application
scores and admissions to bachelor degrees in an OECD country. Our
conclusion is that it is possible to significantly reduce disparities
in admission rates affecting intersectional classes with a small loss
in terms of selected candidate aptitude. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to study fairness constraints with regards to
intersectional classes in the context of top-k selection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Avoiding algorithmic discrimination in contemporary information
systems has become a major issue in all areas of computing re-
search [2]. Data mining, machine learning, artificial intelligence,
and information retrieval researchers - often in collaboration with
law scholars and social scientists - have been developing principles,
methods and techniques to detect and mitigate discriminatory al-
gorithmic biases [17]. Indeed, with the increasing automation of
decision processes in all aspects of human life, avoiding unfair and
unacceptable disadvantage for specific individuals and groups has
turned into an urgent political objective, as well as a technical chal-
lenge. Recently, intersectionality theory [7, 10, 13] has enriched the
debate on algorithmic fairness by showing how often discrimina-
tion affects people who lay at the intersection of several protected
attributes. This finding should in turn lead to more effective actions
in this emerging research field.
1.1 Intersectional Effects in University
Admissions
To practically show how several protected attributes can combine
into strongly underprivileged or privileged intersectional classes,
let us look at an example from our dataset, which is described in
detail in Section 5. This dataset represents the centralized admission
process to universities that took place in an OECD country in 2017.1
It contains anonymized data with demographic, socio-economic
and educational information of about 300,000 high school graduates
who were eligible to pursuit a bachelor degree in a university. Only
120,000 of them took the required admission tests, and about 80,000
of them were admitted to a program.
The regular admission process for undergraduate programs in
this country is based on a linear combination of standardized test
scores and high school grades. Each program weights these quan-
tities differently. Students apply by listing up to ten programs in
decreasing order of preference. Each program offers a number of
vacancies and admits the applicants with the highest scores to
fill those vacancies. Once a student is accepted at one of his/her
preferred programs, the next items in his/her preference list are
ignored. In general, admission scores go from 0 to 850 points. Most
1Country name withheld for double-blind review.
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successful applicants have scores above 450 points, but usually 750
points or more are needed to be accepted into the most prestigious
and competitive programs such as medicine, law, or engineering.
To highlight the complex discrimination mosaics behind this ad-
mission system, we selected the following three protected attributes,
coded according to Table 1.
Table 1: Coding of inter-sectional groups.
Socio-economic status 1. High income
2.Medium income
3. Low income
High-school type A. Private
B. Public or subsidized
Regional development a. High-development region
b. Low-development region
• Socio-Economic Status: based on the income decile of the
applicant’s family, we split students into high income (1),
1th to 3rd decile, medium income (2), 4th to 6th decile, and
low income (3), 7th to 10th decile;
• High School Type: students are divided into those who
went to a private (A) high school and those who went to a
public or subsidized (B) one;
• Regional Development: according to 2017 Human De-
velopment Index data for this country,2 we divide students
into those coming from high-development areas/regions (a),
which includes most large metropolitan areas, and those
from low-development areas/regions (b).
The intersection of these attributes gives rise to 12 intersectional
classes. The most privileged group is coded as “1Aa” (high income,
private high school, high-development region), and the most dis-
advantaged group as “3Bb” (low income, public/subsidized high
school, low-development region).
The plot of Figure 1, which considers only the applicants who
were eventually admitted to some university program, shows the
distribution of admission scores among students of each class. As
we can see, the twelve intersectional classes have substantially
different admission score distributions. For instance, the average
score decreases by more than 60 points from the most privileged
group (1Aa - High Income, Private High School, High-Development
Region) to the most underprivileged group (3Bb - Low Income,
Public or Subsidized High School, Low-Development Region). It
is important to note that often just a few points can determine a
student’s chances to get admitted to a specific program.
By taking a closer look, we can then a complex intersectional
structure of privilege, for example:
• coming from a low-development region does not make much
of a difference for students from families with high income,
while is has a moderate effect–10 points on average–on low-
income students;
• going to a private school gives a large advantage (+35 points)
to high-income students living in a highly developed region,
but not as much (+10 points) to low-income students;
2Reference omitted for double-blind review.
• in high-development regions, in public or subsidized high
schools, having low income gives a moderate disadvantage
(-16 points), that worsens if you live in a low-development
region (-25 points);
• both in low- and high- development regions, going to a
private high school gives a large advantage only if you come
from a high-income family (+38 or +43 points of difference);
In a nutshell, what we observe is that two opposite forms of
discrimination take place. On the one hand, the compound effect of
having a low income in a low-development region and going to a
public or subsidized high school makes this specific intersectional
class the most underprivileged and shows that these three disadvan-
tages reinforce each other. On the other hand, having a high income,
going to a private high school and living in a high-development
region generates a strong condition of privilege and is not just the
sum of these advantages.
For instance, all other things being equal, suppose having low
income decreases an applicant’s expected score by 10 points with
respect to his or her high income counterparts, while going to
a public high school induces a 5 point drop in average outcome
with respect to private high school students. In an intersectional
scenario, on average more than 15 points of difference would be
expected between poor students going to a public high school and
rich students going to private high schools. Such effects may well
reduce social mobility and facilitate the perpetuation of privilege.
1.2 Affirmative Action in Top-K Selection
The algorithmic problem of considering group representation crite-
ria when selecting the top k individuals from a pool of candidates
for an educational program, a job position, or a scholarship has
been widely studied [15, 16, 33, 40]. This choice is generally made
on the grounds of some future performance indicators or standard-
ized tests. Given a predictor trained on historical data, a ranking
is generated and only people in the top k slots are selected. Fre-
quently, though, these selection processes give rise to subtle forms
of discrimination, mainly due to historical legacies that block some
social groups from performing well in the relevant indicators and
tests. For this reason, when designing such systems, it is often
recommended to design appropriate constraints that would eventu-
ally adjust disparities, particularly in prestigious institutions from
which underprivileged students are more often marginalized [18].
From a technical standpoint, one of the most widespread ways
of measuring algorithmic fairness is through the notion of demo-
graphic parity or statistical parity [22]. This notion implies that the
probability of a candidate to be selected is independent from the
whole set of protected attributes. In other words, we want that–
on average–people from all intersectional classes have the same
chance of getting admitted. These corrective interventions usually
go under the name of affirmative action or positive action policies.
More specifically, in the case of top-k selection policies, there are
two essential objectives hoped to be achieved through the imple-
mentation of an affirmative action: (i) to select candidates who have
a high expected performance, and (ii) to ensure candidates from
disadvantaged backgrounds are well represented. Both properties
meet some notion of fairness: the former in favor of general utility,
the latter against discrimination not related to performance.
Intersectional Affirmative Action Policies for Top-k Candidates Selection Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
Figure 1: Range of scores obtained by groups at the intersection of socio-economic status, high school type, and regional
development.
As can be easily guessed, however, an intricate and deeply rooted
historic system of discrimination makes the actual admission pro-
cess disadvantageous for some intersectional social groups. In other
words, a student’s position in the final ranking and his/her chances
of being admitted to a university program are correlated with cul-
tural, social and economic protected attributes that should not play
a role in the process. Consequently, alongside the regular admission
process, many countries and universities put in place additional
affirmative action programs intended for students who come from
disadvantaged backgrounds [5, 32].
1.3 Our contribution
In this paper, we formalize the problem of mitigating intersectional
discrimination in admission policies and present algorithms to ad-
dress it. These algorithms maximize the total utility for the system,
expressed as the sum of all the admission scores of the selected stu-
dents, while reducing the discrepancies between the admission rate
of underprivileged and privileged intersectional classes. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of these methods by performing several
experiments in the context of university admissions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews
previous work related to ours. Section 3 introduces formally our
problem statement. Section 4 describes the algorithms we propose,
which are experimentally evaluated in Section 5. The last section
presents our conclusions and suggests future work.
2 RELATEDWORK AND BACKGROUND
In this section we summarize previous work on fairness-aware
top-k selection and data-driven affirmative action. We also provide
some background on intersectionality theory.
2.1 Fairness-Aware Top-K Selection
Algorithmic fairness in data mining and machine learning appli-
cations is an emerging research area - for a survey, see [29] - and
scholars have recently started studying fairness in ranking or top-k
selection. For instance, Celis et al. [8] and Stoyanovich et al. [36]
incorporated fairness constraints in batch processing and online
processing respectively. In these works, every element is associated
a certain utility and belongs to a specific group. In forming the
ranking, constraints on the minimum and maximum number of
candidates from every group have to be met. The goal is to rank
candidates by decreasing utility without violating the constraints.
In an attempt to determine whether a specific ranking is statisti-
cally compatible with a random process that draws candidates from
protected and non-protected populations, Zehlike et al. [40] pro-
pose a fair representation condition based on a binomial test. Other
proposed tests for fair rankings tend to be based on ensuring that
members of a protected group are sufficiently included among the
top positions in the ranking, i.e., they use some form of positional
discount when computing the benefit or visibility that a ranking ap-
portions to members of different groups [15, 34]. Current methods
to create fair rankings tend to be based on Learning To Rank (LTR),
extending the traditional objective in LTR of maximizing ranking
similarity with training data with an additional term penalizing
disparities in ranking across groups [35, 41].
Kearns et al. [24] studied the case of selecting k candidates drawn
from different groups in which candidates across groups are not
comparable. Hence, what matters is the relative position of can-
didates within their groups. Finally, Mathioudakis et al. [27] used
counterfactual analysis to design affirmative action policies that are
applied either at the stage of candidate scoring (i.e., giving bonus
points to underrepresented groups) or at the stage of decision (i.e.,
imposing quotas for the acceptance of underrepresented groups).
In comparison with previous work, we design affirmative ac-
tion policies for the intersection of multiple protected attributes,
and our objective is to reduce disparities in admission rates across
intersectional groups.
2.2 Data-Driven Affirmative Action
Downstream effects of affirmative action. Much research has
been conducted on downstream or “cascade” effects of affirmative
action policies. From a theoretical standpoint, Hu and Chen [20]
consider a labor market of either temporary or permanent employ-
ers. Temporary employers are required to hire from disadvantaged
groups, while permanent employers can hire based on expected
utility alone. The intention is to reduce discrimination by absorb-
ing workers from disadvantaged groups in the temporary market.
Along the same lines, Kannan et al. [23] focused their work on af-
firmative action policies in education, looking at the employability
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Mathioudakis, Castillo, Barnabo, Celis
of graduates from disadvantaged groups. Their goal is to achieve
employment rate parity, possibly by creating an incentive for em-
ployers to adopt a color-blind hiring policy. Finally, Mouzannar
et al. [31] analyzed the effect of affirmative action policies on the
qualifications of different groups in society.
Data-driven analysis. It is now well documented that in the last
sixty years major universities - both public and private - have been
slowly adopting admission mechanisms that unwillingly discrimi-
nate historically disadvantaged and underrepresented groups [5, 32].
Students who come from a privileged background - wealthier, more
educated, better integrated into the political and social system -
tend to outperform other students even though there are no signifi-
cant differences in their QI or expected academic performance [3].
In other words, selection processes tend to reproduce systems of
power within society. For example, as Wightman showed [37] with
a large experiment, in the US law school applicants of color had sig-
nificantly poorer results on admission tests, but once admitted their
performance was comparable with that of white students.To combat
this distortion, several affirmative action policies have been put
in place worldwide. Brazil, for example, has promoted bonus and
racial quotas [11, 14] that resulted in an increase of both black stu-
dents and students coming from low socioeconomic backgrounds in
major public universities. Other countries, instead, used coefficient-
based policies to counterbalance differences in standardized test
results between men and women [1], as well as between students
from private and public high schools [9], with some success [25]. In
the US, university admission officers tended to admit disadvantaged
students at a higher rate when provided with information about a
candidate’s economic and family background [4].
In these and other countries there is abundant data about univer-
sity admissions, more applicants than vacancies at top institutions,
and a need to optimize resources. This means data-driven policy
design can be undertaken to address this need, which is what we
describe in this paper through an admission algorithm that is aware
of intersectional classes.
2.3 Background: Intersectionality
The term intersectionality first appeared in a 1989 paper [10] by
civil rights advocate Kimberlé Crenshaw, who used it to describe
those forms of social inequality that stem from interlocking social
institutions. Noticing that the first two waves of feminism mainly
focused on middle class white women’s struggles, Crenshaw pro-
posed instead to look at how one’s multiple identities (e.g., gender,
race, class, sexuality, ability) combine to create different and specific
modes of discrimination. It was not by change that in its political
agenda [38] the third wave feminism - which emerged shortly af-
ter Crenshaw’s paper - paid greater attention to people who are
subjected to multiple forms of inequality [28].
More specifically, these new feminists opened up to the idea of
addressing black women’s specific condition, instead of treating all
women as if they experienced the same difficulties. Needless to say,
intersectionality has raised criticism due to its difficult practical
implementation and the possible risk of paradoxically weakening
civil and social rights movements. As Rebecca Reilly-Cooper and
Rekia Jibrin point out, excessive fragmentation and individualiza-
tion of discriminatory conditions can in fact make very difficult to
Table 2: Notation
n Number of candidates
p Selection rate: fraction of candidates to be admitted
C Intersectional classes
ni Cardinality of the ith intersectional class
ui j Utility of candidate j from intersectional class i
xi j Decision for candidate j from class i; selected (1) or not (0)
U Set of utilities of all candidatesU =
⋃{ui j }
X Set of decisions for all candidates X =
⋃{xi j }
synthesize a common actionable and to reach legal praxis [21] as
the process towards recognition of previous denied rights involves
the mobilization of a large mass of people.
Nevertheless, both the UK and the EU [26] have non-discrimination
law that tries to take into account complex and deep rooted forms
of intersectional unfair treatment. The UK, in particular, lists “age,
disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil partnership, preg-
nancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual ori-
entation” as “protected characteristics” under the 2010 Equality
Act. Section 14 of this bill contains a provision to cover discrim-
ination on up to two combined grounds. This section, however,
never became effective because the government considered it “too
complicated and burdensome for businesses” [39].
With regards to computer science research, just recently scholars
started incorporating the concept of intersectionality in their work
on algorithmic fairness [7, 13]. Intersectional discrimination has
been investigated in the context of automated facial analysis [6],
expectation constraints [12], classification problems [30], and many
other fields of artificial intelligence [19].
In contrast to previous work, this paper develops a top-k candi-
date selection algorithm specifically designed to mitigate intersec-
tional discrimination.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we present our notation and formally describe our
problem statement.
3.1 Setting
In our setting, a set of candidates are considered for selection by
one institution, under the constraint that only the top k of them are
to be selected. This setting arises in many real-life scenarios – for
example, when multiple professionals apply for a public sector job
or multiple students apply for a position at a university program.
Intersectional classes. Each individual is assumed to be associ-
ated with certain protected attributes, such as gender, race, sexual
orientation, nationality, disability status. These attributes are rep-
resented with categorical variables in the data. For example, we
may have values {male, female, other } for gender, {European descent,
African descent, . . . } for race, and so on. Intersectional classes stem
from the combination of protected attribute values. For example,
considering the attributes of gender and race alone, one intersec-
tional class corresponds to individuals who are both female and of
African descent, another to ones who are female and of European
descent, and so on. The number of intersectional classes grows
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exponentially with the number of protected attributes, which is
one of the reasons why making a selection process fair with respect
to admission rates of intersectional classes (or other criterion) can
be computationally costly.
Candidate utility.We assume that every candidate is associated
with a selection score that predicts future performance. By default,
the selection process aims to select those candidates who will have
the better future performance at an institution – and, from the
institution’s point of view, a candidate’s selection score represents
the utility of the candidate for the institution. In what follows, we
will write ui j to denote the utility of the jth candidate from the ith
intersectional class.Without loss of generality, we assumeui j ≥ uik
if j < k , i.e., candidates are sorted by non-increasing utility.
Selection rate. The output of the selection process is a set of k
candidates. Assuming that there are n candidates in total, this cor-
responds to a selection rate p = k/n. In what follows, we formulate
our objective and operations in terms of p for ease of presentation,
but we note that there is an exact correspondence with the number
k of selected candidates. In other words, any policy based on selec-
tion rates can be transformed into a policy based on quotas, and
viceversa.
3.2 Problem formulation
In designing an affirmative action policy, we have two goals: first,
to maximize the utility for the institution, i.e. to admit students
with the best chances of having good academic performance; and
second, to minimize disparities between the observed selection
rates of different groups of candidates. There is a natural trade-off
between these two goals: to equalize selection rate across classes,
we will have to forgo the selection of some candidates with high
utility from an overrepresented class to enable the selection of
candidates with lower utility from an underrepresented class. Using
the notation summarized on Table 2 we formalize these goals and
the trade-off between them into the objective function J below.
J = J({xi j }) = B({xi j }) − λD({xi j }) (1)
B(X ) =
|C |∑
i=1
nj∑
j=1
ui jxi j
D(X ) =
|C |∑
i=1

∑nj
j=1 xi j
nj
− p

The objective J is expressed as aweighted sum of two terms,B andD.
Essentially, B expresses the total utility from all selected candidates,
while D expresses the total absolute discrepancy of selection rates
against the target selection rate p across all intersectional classes.
The two quantities are combined into the same objective function
via scalar factor λ, which expresses the trade-off we are willing to
make between utility, on one hand, and selection rate disparities
across classes, on the other. Essentially, λ expresses howmany units
of utility we are willing to forgo, to decrease disparity by one unit.
It is worth noting that this function penalizes both positive and
negative disparities. For instance, let assume that all members of
one intersectional class are the only ones admitted. In this scenario,
D would be equal to (1 − p) + (|C | − 1)p.
We can now formalize the problem we wish to solve.
Problem 1. Given a pool of candidates divided into |C | non-
overlapping intersectional classes, utilities {ui j }, a target selection
rate p, and a trade-off factor λ, make selections {xi j } of k = pn
candidates so that J({xi j }) is maximized.
4 ALGORITHMS
In this section we provide two algorithms to identify the set of
applicants that maximize the objective function J describred in
Section 3.2: an optimal dynamic programming algorithm with run-
ning time O(|C | · n2), and a faster greedy heuristic that requires
O(|C | · n) operations. Naturally, if λ = 0, the optimal solution cor-
responds to the top k = p · n of students in the admission ranking,
regardless of their protected attributes. If, on the contrary, we set λ
to a sufficiently large value, we obtain a solution with minimum
discrepancies, composed of the top p · nj applicants from each in-
tersectional class j. We remark that in all solutions generated by
these algorithms the admitted applicants are the top-scoring within
each class. The goal of all algorithms is to determine the decisions
X ; all other quantities of Table 2 are considered given and fixed.
4.1 Optimal Dynamic Programming Approach
The Dynamic programming algorithm (DynPr) maintains a table
T having |C | rows (one for each intersectional class), and k = n · p
columns (one for each vacancy). This table holds in cell T (i, j) the
maximum value attainable for the objective function when admit-
ting a total of j applicants exclusively from intersectional classes
1, 2, . . . , i . The final value of the objective function is observed in
cell T (|C |,k).
DynPr maintains a second, auxiliary table R of i rows and j
columns, which contains in cell R(i, j) the objective function con-
tribution for intersectional class i if the top j students from this
intersectional class are admitted in the final solution. Formally:
R(i, j) =
j∑
k=1
uik − λ
 jni − p
 . (2)
DynPr is descibed in Algorithm 1, and it outputs the maximum
value of the objective number. The algorithm performs careful
book-keeping so as to never admit from one class more than its
nj candidates. Specifically, updates are performed only for up to
min{nj ,k = n · p} candidates from class j (Alg. 1, for-loop at line 5)
but not for more ((Alg. 1, for-loop at line-10). To retrieve the number
of admitted students per class, which unambiguously identifies the
admitted students, we backtrack using an additional data structure
that maintains the maximum index found on line 6 of the algorithm;
details are omitted for presentation clarity. An implementation of
this algorithm can be found in our code and data release.3
3URL omitted for double-blind review.
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Algorithm 1 DynPr
1: InitializeU using Equation 2
2: Initialize T ← 0
3: T (−1, ·) ← T (·,−1) ← 0
4: for i = 1, . . . , |C | do
5: for j = 1, . . . ,min{nj ,n · p} do
6: Ti j = maxk=0,1, ..., j [U (i,k) +T (i − 1, j − k)]
7: end for
8: for j = min{nj ,n · p} + 1, . . . ,n · p do
9: Ti j = Ti(j−1)
10: end for
11: end for
12: return T (|C |,n · p)
Analysis. By observing the nested loops in the algorithm in lines
4-6, we can see its running time is O(|C | · n2). Its optimality can be
proven by induction on the number of classes |C |. If |C | = 1 then
the algorithm simply picks the number of students j that maximizes
U (1, j), which corresponds to the optimal value of J, which is what
we seek to optimize (compare equations 1 and 2). Now let us assume
DynPr yields the optimal solution with i classes. If we consider one
additional class, we will consider for each number of candidates
j = 1, 2, . . . ,M = min{nj ,n · p} in the additional class (line 5), the
best solution ofM − j candidates from the the first i classes. This is
optimal as per the inductive hypothesis, due to the additivity of the
objective function J (Eq. 1) over disjoint classes. Hence, the output
is optimal.
4.2 Greedy Approximation
The Greedy algorithm (Greedy), described in pseudocode in Al-
gorithm 2, proceeds as follows: at every step it adds the applicant
who increases the value of the objective J the most. The algorithm
runs until k = n · p applicants are admitted.
Algorithm 2 Greedy
1: Selected← ∅
2: for j = 1, . . . ,n · p do
3: /* Select the candidate that maximizes J */
4: x ← argmaxx<Selected J(Selected∪x)
5: Selected← Selected ∪ x
6: end for
7: return Selected
Analysis. The running time of the algorithm isO(kn). Even though
empirically we find that the greedy algorithm often produces the
same solution as the optimal algorithm for our data, there are cases
in which it produces a sub-optimal solution (by a small margin).
We elaborate on this point in Section 6.
Note also that the running time of Greedy could be further
optimized. To see why, notice thatGreedy always selects candidates
in decreasing utility order within class. Therefore, the acceptance
of each candidate has an effect to the objective function J that is
known in advance, allowing us to avoid the expensive step (4) in
Alg. 2. In more detail, we calculate the benefit each of the top-k
candidates brings to J when added by greedy; the running time
of this operation is O(Ck). Subsequently, the top-k candidates of
each class are traversed in parallel and “merged” to keep the top-k
elements from all classes; the running time of this operation isO(k).
Therefore, greedy can be optimized to run in O(Ck) < O(nk) time.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
We perform several experiments in the context of university admis-
sions, using a large dataset of university applicants in an OECD
country, and measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the al-
gorithms we have proposed. In terms of the setting described in
Section 3, each university applicant is considered a candidate in
our problem formulation; intersectional classes are defined based
on attributes associated with the applicants; the program that ac-
cepts applications is the institution that selects some of them for
admission; and the admission of the best applicants for a univer-
sity program is framed as a problem of top-k candidate selection
(Problem 1).
5.1 Dataset Description
Undergraduate programs in the studied country admit students
based on a linear combination of standardized test scores across
four different subjects (math, language, natural sciences, and social
sciences) and their high school grades. In 2017, the most recent
year for which we have an entire anonymized dataset, over 300,000
people registered to take the standardized tests needed for the ap-
plication process. Out of these, only about 120,000 actually took the
tests and applied to one or more programs. A student’s application
consists of a ranked list of up to 10 programs in decreasing order of
preference. Of the 120,000 applicants, 75,000 were eventually admit-
ted to some program; except for students with exceptionally high
scores and grades, the program to which they were admitted was
not their top preference. For all the candidates, we were given ac-
cess to demographic, socio-economic and educational information
including: nationality, gender, birth year, civil status, high school
of provenance (type and region), and household characteristics
(income decile, parents’ occupation and level of education). High
school grades and standardized test results were provided as well.
Other researchers can apply to access the same dataset.4
Each program weighs scores and high school grades differently,
and can set minimum thresholds of scores for applicants. In general,
admission scores of successful applications are above 450 points,
with more prestigious and competitive programs usually accepting
students above 750 points, out of a maximum of 850.
It is worth noting that not just the chance of getting admitted to
university changes for different social groups, but access to quality
education itself is strongly correlated with socio-economic status.
Certain sections of society that make up a large portion of the
total population are scarcely represented in the application process.
For instance, many students coming from families that lack the
means to support them through university, may not even apply to
a tertiary education process.
4Instructions will be provided in our camera-ready version.
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5.2 Experiments
Our experiments consider the 75,000 students who were eventually
admitted to a program. Since the majority of programs received
fewer applicants than the number of vacancies they offered, and
students can apply to up to 10 programs, this means we removed
from the dataset students who either have very low scores, such
that they would not qualify for most of the programs; or for some
reason did not apply to enough programs to be admitted by at least
one. For the intersectional classes we consider the intersection of
the 3 × 2 × 2 categories described in Table 1, generating 12 groups
that differ significantly in their admission score distributions.
We conducted two different sets of experiments to which we
refer as Single-track and Separate-tracks, described below.
Single-track. In the first set of experiments, we consider the
hypothetical scenario in which all students in our data applied
to the same one program. The purpose of this is to explore the
effect of the algorithms in a setting that is independent of their
particular choice of program. For both the greedy and the dynamic
approaches, we ran algorithms with four different admission rates
(p ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.30, 0.50}), gradually increasing the weight λ from
zero until we reach no discrepancy.
Separate-tracks. In the second set of experiments, we tested our
algorithms on a few specific programs. We chose four programs
among the most selective ones (these are four medical schools),
and other four among those that had the highest number of admit-
ted students (these are two engineering schools and two business
schools). This second set of experiments explores the effect of the
algorithms in more realistic settings – and helps highlight how the
same approach performs across different programs.
6 RESULTS
We now present the results from the experimental evaluation. A
first observation is that in practice achieving parity of acceptance
rate between the intersectional classes leads to a decrease of just a
few points in the average utility, i.e., the average admission score
of accepted applicants. A second observation is that even if the
greedy algorithm is not guaranteed to yield an optimal solution, it
almost always finds the same solution as the dynamic programming
approach and it runs much faster. In what follows, the reported
results are obtained with the DynPr algorithm, unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
6.1 Effectiveness
Single-track. Figure 2 shows results for the hypothetical setting
where all students in the dataset apply for the same program. In the
top of Figure 2, we plot the average discrepancy in admission rates
across all the 12 intersectional groups, for three different target
admission rates, and for varying values of the parameter λ. The left-
most points in these plots (i.e., for utility decrease = 0) correspond
to the case of λ = 0, i.e., when no affirmative action is enacted.
Moreover, the right-most points in the same plots correspond to
the case when the discrepancy of admission rates is practically
removed (specifically, when D falls below 0.01). We can clearly
see a trade-off between disparity and average utility (i.e., average
admission score of admitted applicants). Specifically, there is a drop
of about 10 utility points to reach perfect admission rate parity -
when the target admission rate is the lowest among those tested
(p = 0.05).
Notice that, as the admission rate increases (from p = 0.05 on the
left-most plot to p = 0.50 to the right-most one), the utility decrease
required to reach parity decreases as well (from about 10 utility
points, to 2.5 utility points). This is due to the fact that inequalities
are more pronounced at the higher end of utility, i.e., for applicants
with the best scores. That is, the score distributions of different
intersectional classes are more different in the top tail. We remark
that in a practical application, acceptance rate parity might not be
the goal, given that even a partial reduction of a large historical
disparity could be sufficient and desirable as policy objective.
In the bottom of Figure 2, we break down the discrepancy across
intersectional classes. As expected, we can see that an increase in λ
leads to admitting more students from the disadvantaged classes
and fewer students from the privileged classes.
How would someone use these plots to design an affirmative
action policy? One natural way is the following: given a target
selection rate p, the policy maker would use the plot corresponding
to it; and given an acceptable decrease in utility δB , the policy
maker would choose the value for λ that corresponds to the point
in the plot with utility decrease = δB .
Separate-tracks. Figure 3 shows results for affirmative action
policies applied on one of eight individual programs. In this setting,
the applicant pool consists of those applicants in our data who, in
their application, ranked each program higher than the one where
they eventually got admitted.
A first caveat in this applied analysis case is the often small num-
ber of applicants in some of the 12 intersectional classes. In fact,
for highly competitive programs, some of the most disadvantaged
groups are practically absent in the application pool. In practice,
this means that the discrepancy values for intersectional classes
vary abruptly with the addition of admitted applicants, and the
results cannot be considered robust. For instance, when an inter-
sectional class contains a single applicant, not admitting him/her
would lead to −p discrepancy for that class, or 1 − p otherwise. For
this reason, we adapted our objective function (and therefore, also
the algorithms) to ignore intersectional classes containing fewer
than three (3) applicants. Even with this adaptation, however, the
remaining intersectional classes are sufficient to obtain meaningful
insights from the application of our approach on a variety of real
situations.
As shown in Figure ??, the general trend is similar for all in-
dividual programs, with a steep decrease in average discrepancy
(note the y scale is logarithmic) as the average utility decreases
by one or two points. Unlike the hypothetical Single-track case
(Figure 2), individual programs require a comparatively smaller
sacrifice of utility to reach parity, also because generally they show
less inter-class discrepancy (Figure 3).
Arguably, in a program admitting students with 750 out of 850
points of score in standardized tests, a difference of one or two
points (which may represent a difference of less than one question
answered incorrectly on a test) cannot be expected to have a no-
ticeable effect on their academic performance or their chances of
graduating several years later. Moreover, as particularly evident
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Figure 2: Average (top) and per-group (bottom) discrepancies in admission rates if all students were to apply to the same pro-
gram, for four different target admission rates. In this and the following figures, larger values of λ lead to smaller discrepancies
and less utility.
in figures 3(d) and 3(h), when algorithms are applied in a single
program scenario, it is quite common for most of the intersectional
classes to maintain the same discrepancy throughout the entire
process. Usually, only the most privileged and most disadvantaged
groups, such as 1Aa, 1Ab, 1Ba, 1Bb, 2Ba, and 3Ba, see their dis-
crepancy and average admission score modified in order to reach
parity.
6.2 Efficiency
Figure ?? plots the running time of the algorithm for sub-samples
of increasing size drawn from the total population of students. We
observe that the greedy method is orders of magnitude faster than
the dynamic programming method. In practice, throughout all of
our experiments, the greedy algorithm only failed to find the opti-
mum result in one configuration: the Single-track setting with
admission rate 0.30 and λ = 0. However, in the case of university
admission and other high-risk scenarios affecting the future of thou-
sands of people, we recommend to use the dynamic programming
algorithm that has an optimality guarantee.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a principled approach to tackle the
algorithmic problem of intersectional unfairness in the context of
top-k selection. We designed two different algorithms that allow to
simultaneously (i) select candidates with high utility, and (ii) level
up the representation of disadvantaged intersectional classes. To
test our methodology, we used real data from an OECD country
to simulate its 2017 university admission process. With extensive
experiments, we showed that we can easily reach intersectional
class parity by slightly adjusting the admission thresholds. Namely,
a relatively small point decrease in the average admission score
leads to almost zero unfairness.
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Figure 3: (Best seen in color.) Per-group discrepancies in admission rates per program; n is the number of vacancies and u the
average score of those admitted to these programs. Programs P1-P4 are four highly selective programs (all of them aremedical
schools), while P5-P8 are four large programs having more than 350 vacancies each (two engineering schools, two business
schools).
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